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V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) and the Order from the Utah Supreme
Court dated January 27, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
from the district court's Memorandum Decision granting Defendant's Rule 12(b)(2)
Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Relief Under Rule 56(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendant offers the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on
pages 1-2 of the Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal ("Plaintiffs Brief).

This

formulation of the issues more accurately captures the arguments presented to the district
court and the bases for the district court's Memorandum Decision:
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court correctly determine that it could not exercise
personal jurisdiction over Defendant, whose sole known contact with Utah was the
sending of a lone email to a resident of this State, where there is no evidence that
Defendant actively, knowingly or purposefully targeted the residents of this State, and no
evidence that Defendant had any other contact, significant or otherwise, with Utah?
Sub-Issue No. 1(a):

Did

the

now

repealed

Utah

Unsolicited

Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, §§13-36-101 et. seq. (repealed
effective May 3, 2004) confer the Utah courts with personal jurisdiction over
anyone who might violate its regulatory provisions?
Sub-Issue No. 1(b):

Does Utah's long-arm statute, particularly its

provisions relating to "transacting business within the state" and committing
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tortious "injury" within the state, apply to confer the Utah courts with personal
jurisdiction over Defendant?
Issue No. 1(c):

Would the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant

under the circumstances of this case violate its rights to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, "according the trial court no
particular deference." Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 11, 54
P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). Its
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, however, and should be reversed only when
they are against the clear weight of the evidence or this Court reaches a firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. See Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, f 17, 80 P.3d 553,
558.
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed "for
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." Board of Ed. of
Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, f 1, 194 P.3d 234, 235.
ISSUE NO- 2: Did the district court err in concluding that Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to motions for summary judgment actually brought
or determined under Rule 56, and not to motions brought and decided under Rule
12(b)(2)? Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs
Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f) where neither Plaintiff nor his attorneys filed a timely
supporting affidavit setting forth the discovery he sought to obtain, the reasons why such

discovery was necessary, or the reasons why he could not adequately respond to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without such discovery?
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law which are reviewed "for
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." Board of Ed., 2004
UT 37 at f l .
A district court's ruling on a motion for continuance under Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed "for abuse of discretion." Grynberg v. Questar
Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 56, 70 P.3d 1, 14. Under this standard, this district court's
decision shall not be reversed unless it "'exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" See
Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App. 397, ^ 6 , 38 P.3d 984, 988
(quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)).
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the issues raised on appeal:
1.

Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code Ann.

§§13-36-101 et. seq. (repealed effective May 3, 2004);
2.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-24(1) & (3);

3.

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and

4.

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, this appeal is not about the merits of his claim

that Defendant sent him an email in violation of the Unsolicited Commercial and
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Sexually Explicit Email Act, §§13-36-101 et. seq. (repealed effective May 3, 2004)
("Email Act"). The question is whether the Utah courts can assert personal jurisdiction
over Defendant, a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in California
based on the receipt of a lone email by a resident of this State, where there is no evidence
that Defendant actively, knowingly or purposefully targeted the residents of this State or
had any other contact, significant or otherwise, with Utah or its residents. This case also
raises issues regarding the applicability of Rule 56(f) to Rule 12(b)(2) proceedings, and
whether it is fundamentally fair to subject a defendant to timely and expensive discovery
when there has been no prima facie showing to support personal jurisdiction.
Although Plaintiff is correct that these are issues of first impression for this Court,
such reference significantly overstates the actual importance of this case. The Email Act
was repealed by the Utah Legislature effective May 3, 2004. Any decision in this case
will therefore have minimal application and will not significantly impact Utah law.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake

County, Sandy Division, on or about January 21, 2003, alleging that Defendant sent or
caused to be sent to Plaintiff an "unsolicited commercial email" in violation of the Email
Act, asserting the Email Act itself as the sole basis for jurisdiction. See Complaint,
Record at 1-4 (courtesy copy attached hereto as Addendum 1).
2.

Although the Complaint asserts that "Plaintiff is a Utah resident," it

contains no allegation that Defendant (i) knew of Plaintiffs residency prior to sending
the allegedly offending email, (ii) knowingly or intentionally targeted the residents of

Utah with its allegedly offending email advertisement, (iii) actively solicited or engaged
in business in Utah, or (iv) had any other contact, significant or otherwise, with Utah.
See id.
3.

On or about May 27, 2003, without answering the Complaint, Defendant

filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum, asserting that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See id. at 5-19. This motion was supported
by the Affidavit of Robert Gautereaux, Defendant's president. See id. at 20-22 (courtesy
copy attached hereto as Addendum 2).
4.

On or about June 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss. See id. at 23-39. Appended thereto was the Affidavit of Frank
Amyx. See id. at 37-39 (courtesy copy attached hereto as Addendum 3). Like the
Complaint, while this affidavit alleges that Plaintiff was "in [his] home in Utah when [he]
received the offending spam," it contains no allegation that Defendant (i) knew of
Plaintiff's residency prior to sending the allegedly offending email, (ii) knowingly or
intentionally targeted Utah residents with its allegedly offending email advertisement,
(iii) actively solicited or engaged in business in Utah, or (iv) had any other contact,
significant or otherwise, with Utah. See id.
5.

Defendant filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Players

Vacation Club, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss on or about June 18, 2003. See id. at 40-50.
6.

On or about June 19, 2003, ten days after Plaintiff filed his memorandum

opposing the motion to dismiss, and one day after Defendant filed its reply memorandum,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f). See id. at 54-55. This motion was
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not accompanied by any affidavits, as expressly required by Rule 56(0, and neither the
motion nor the simultaneously filed memorandum in support contained any explanation
regarding the type of discovery sought, how such discovery might impact Defendant's
motion to dismiss, or why Plaintiff could not adequately respond to Defendant's
jurisdictional claims without discovery. See id. at 54-59.
7.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for

Relief Under Rule 56(f) on or about June 30, 2003, asserting that Rule 56(f) did not apply
to motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction brought under Rule 12(b)(2), and
highlighting Plaintiffs failure, in any event, to comply with the requirements of Rule
56(f). See id at 63-67.
8.

On or about July 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum in Further

Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f).

See id, at 68-70.

Although this

memorandum asserts that "[d]iscovery is required" and that "the reasons have been
previously set forth in the motions," the reply memorandum again fails to provide any
information regarding the type of discovery sought, how such discovery might impact
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or why Plaintiff could not adequately respond to
Defendant's motion without such discovery. See id.
9.

Accompanying the reply memorandum was the Affidavit of Denver C.

Snuffer, Jr., counsel to Plaintiff, purportedly submitted "pursuant to Rule 56(1)." See id.
at 71-73 (courtesy copy attached hereto as Addendum 4).

Although this affidavit

indicated a desire to take the deposition of Mr. Gautereaux, Defendant's president, it
made clear that Plaintiff sought only to explore (i) Mr. Gautereaux's assertions that

Defendant sent emails only to those who had given their express permission to receive
such emails (a defense to liability under the Email Act), and (ii) the methods by which
Defendant acquired and gathered alleged mailing lists. See id. These issues go entirely
to the underlying merits of Plaintiff's Email Act claim, and are not relevant to
Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
10.

On or about March 10, 2004, the Honorable Judge Royal I. Hansen issued a

Memorandum Decision granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f), see id at 89-98:l
a.

With respect to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the district court

specifically concluded that neither the Email Act nor Utah's long-arm statute "confer
personal jurisdiction over Defendant" and that "[w]ithout more, the single email contact
between Plaintiff and Defendant [is] inadequate to create personal jurisdiction." Id. at 97.
In so holding, the district court specifically stated that it was "not persuaded that a
violation of [the Email Act's] regulatory requirement raises to a level of a tort within the
meaning of Utah's long arm statute." Id.
b.

With respect to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f), the

district court concluded that the relief requested "does not apply to a Rule 12(b) motion

The Memorandum Decision issued in this case is entirely consistent with the ruling
previously issued by the Honorable Judge Denise Posse Lindberg Craig Hughes v.
Cosmo.com, Inc., Case No. 020411292 (3rd Dist., Sandy Dept. Apr. 4, 2003), a courtesy
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 5. Plaintiff's counsel did not appeal the
Cosmo.com decision.
606802.2
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to dismiss," and that in any event, "the information Plaintiff claims it would question
Defendant about does not relate to personal jurisdiction of Defendant." Id. at 96-97.

Ill- STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are established in the record, are undisputed, and are relevant
on appeal:2
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah Resident. See Complaint at 1, f 1, Record at 1.

2.

Defendant is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in

California. See Affidavit of Robert L. Gautereaux at 1, f 3, Record at 20 ("Gautereaux
Aff.")
3.

Defendant owns a website by the name of MyComputerClub.com, a passive

website which merely makes information available to those who are interested in the
information. See id at 2, f 5, Record at 21.
4.

Defendant does not maintain a registered agent in Utah. See id at f 6.

5.

Defendant does not own, lease or control any property, real or personal, in

Utah. See id at f 7.

2

All of the "facts" set forth in Plaintiffs Brief go entirely to the substantive merits of his
claim that Defendant sent an email in violation of the Email Act. None of those facts are
relevant to the question of personal jurisdiction. For purposes of preserving its record,
however, and based on the Affidavit of Mr. Gautereaux, Defendant denies those facts
asserted in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, and 10-13 on pages 5-6 of Plaintiffs Brief. Defendant
further rejects Plaintiff's suggestions in paragraphs 7-9 that there were multiple emails
sent to Utah residents, in violation of the Email Act, as there are no facts in the record to
support such allegations.

6.

Defendant has no employees, does not recruit employees in Utah or any

other state, and does not maintain any employees, offices or agents in Utah. See id at f j
8&14.
7.

Defendant is a closely held corporation and has no shareholders who reside

in Utah. See id at f 91.
8.

Defendant has no phone or facsimile listings within Utah. See id at f 10.

9.

Defendant does not actively market or advertise in Utah, and does not

particularly solicit Utah residents to view its website or purchase its products. See id at %
11.
10.

Defendant does not send agents into Utah to conduct business, sell products

or services, or visit customers. See id at % 12.
11.

Defendant does not pay taxes in Utah. See id at % 13.

12.

Defendant maintains no bank accounts or other financial arrangements in

Utah. See id at 2-3, f [ 8 & 15, Record at 21-22.
13.

Defendant uses a Florida (as opposed to Utah) based server to host its

website. See id at 3, f 17, Record at 22; see also Memorandum Supporting Defendant
Players Vacation Club, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss at 4, f 19, Record at 11.
14.

Defendant did not itself send emails like the one in question, but engaged a

third-party vendor, Venture Worldwide, Inc. ("Venture"), to send emails on its behalf.
See Gautereaux Aff. at 3, f 16, Record at 22.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction. Although the well-pled allegations in the complaint are generally accepted
as true, mere conclusory statements are not enough, and the factual allegations of the
complaint must be disregarded where they are contradicted by an affidavit from the
defendant.
Plaintiff failed to meet his burden in this case. His Complaint alleges only that he
is a resident of Utah and received an email from Defendant in alleged violation of the
Email Act. His Complaint makes the conclusory assertion that the Email Act itself
provides for jurisdiction. It does not cite Utah's long-arm statute, however, and contains
no well-pled allegations that Defendant knew of Plaintiff's place of residence at the time
the email was sent, or otherwise targeted its solicitation at the residents of this State. The
absence of such allegations renders the Complaint deficient as a matter of law for
purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction.
Moreover, Defendant's own affidavit, uncontested by Plaintiff in all relevant
respects, directly controverts any claim of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the only piece of
evidence Plaintiff has to support his claim of jurisdiction is a lone email advertising
Defendant's passive website, an email which apparently made its way across the vast
expanses of the Internet and into the email account of Plaintiff, who just so happened to
be a Utah resident. This, without more, cannot make out a prima facie case.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that it Could Not Assert Personal
Jurisdiction over Defendant.
Personal jurisdiction may be found only if it is granted by Utah statute and
comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
There is No Statutory Grant of Jurisdiction in this Case.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, neither the Email Act nor Utah's long arm
statute confer personal jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff relies primarily on Section 1336-105 of the Email Act stating, in relevant part, that a civil enforcement action may be
brought by any "person who received the unsolicited commercial email." This section
confers standing, not jurisdiction. It does not give the courts power to hear any case
against any defendant, or provide that any defendant who allegedly violates the Email
Act becomes subject to personal jurisdiction in this State. The fact that a private cause of
action exists under Utah law does not mean that it may always be pursued in a Utah
forum. Such a standard would eviscerate the very protections afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Plaintiff next argues that Defendant transacted business within this State for
purposes of Utah's long-arm statute. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts that because a lone email, arguably commercial in nature, made its way across the vast expanses of the
Internet and into the email account of Plaintiff, a Utah resident, Defendant has
necessarily transacted business in this State. Plaintiff cites no case law in support of his
position, however, and, even considering the liberal and expansive construction
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traditionally applied to this section of Utah's long-arm statute, his assertions stretch the
bounds of reasonableness.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that by allegedly violating the Email Act, Defendant
caused tortious "injury" within this State, another basis for invoking jurisdiction under
the long-arm statute. The Email Act is a pure regulatory statute, however, and does not
establish any claim in tort. Moreover, while the statute provides for civil penalties as a
mechanism and incentive for civil enforcement, it does not recognize the existence of any
actual injury to the recipient of the email. Finally, while Plaintiff may have suffered
damage or harm in Utah, the wrongful act, and thus the injury, actually occurred in the
state from which the email was sent.
Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Would Violate Due Process.
To satisfy the constraints of due process, which requires a defendant to have
"minimum contacts" with the forum state, Plaintiff must establish two things: (1) that the
Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in this
State, and (2) that the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. Plaintiff
contends that minimum contacts can be established by the mere transmission of an email
to the email account of a Utah resident, regardless of whether Defendant actually
intended to target Utah residents or develop a business relationship within Utah, and
despite the lack of evidence that Defendant had any contacts with Utah or any significant
commercial relationship with any Utah resident. Defendant urges this Court to take a
more reasonable and practical approach, and to affirm the district court's ruling that

Defendant's lone email to Plaintiff does not subject it to personal jurisdiction in this
State.
To establish minimum contacts, Plaintiff must establish that the defendant
engaged in activity that was expressly aimed or intentionally directed at Utah residents.
Plaintiff argues that this burden has been met because the email Plaintiff received from
Defendant was a solicitation to do business. What Plaintiff does not and cannot establish,
however, is that Defendant knew or had any reason to know that the recipient was a Utah
resident, or actively and purposefully targeted the subject email or any of its business
activities to the residents of this State. Indeed, the most Plaintiff can establish is that
defendant sent a single email to golfyx@delaware.com, and that this email address
happened to belong to a Utah resident. This is the very type of random and fortuitous
connection to Utah that the courts have routinely rejected.
In any event, it would be unreasonable and offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice if Defendant was required to appear in this suit. This case alleges
a single violation of the Email Act, carrying a maximum statutory penalty of $10.00.
Plaintiffs potential recovery in this case is therefore nominal, particularly in comparison
to the expense Defendant would incur litigating this case in Utah. Any interest Utah may
have had in adjudicating disputes under the Email Act has been significantly diminished
by the repeal of the Email Act in May 2004. The interests of Plaintiff and Utah in
litigating this case in this forum are therefore significantly outweighed by the burden on
Defendant.
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The Trial Court Correctly Denied Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f),
The district court correctly concluded that Rule 56(f) applies only to motions for
summary judgment, and not to motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(2). Alternatively, Plaintiff failed to make out a case for relief under Rule
56(f). Utah law is clear that a motion filed pursuant to Rule 56(f) must be accompanied
by an affidavit setting forth the type of discovery actually sought, how such discovery
might impact Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and why Plaintiff could not adequately
respond to Defendant's motion without such discovery. Plaintiff's counsel made clear in
his own affidavit that discovery was necessary only to question Defendant about its email
solicitation practices. These issues may be relevant to his substantive claims under the
Email Act, but are entirely irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdiction. As such,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion for relief under
Rule 56(f).
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE IN
SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIMS FOR JURISDICTION
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction over

Defendant. See Soma Med. Infl v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th
Cir 1999).

Where, as here, the jurisdictional determination is made solely on the

pleadings and accompanying affidavits, a plaintiff must make out at least a prima facie
case in support of its claims of jurisdiction. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic &
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990).

Although the well-pled

allegations in the plaintiffs complaint are generally accepted as true, see Anderson, 807
P.2d at 827, mere conclusory statements are not enough, see Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed
Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (D. Utah 1998), and the factual allegations of the
Complaint must be disregarded where they are "specifically contradicted]" by an
"affidavit [from the] defendant." Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1308
(Utah 1980).
The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to make out the required
prima facie case of personal jurisdiction against Defendant in this case. To begin with,
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges only that Plaintiff is a resident of Utah who received an
email from Defendant that allegedly violated the Email Act, and makes the conclusory
assertion that jurisdiction is therefore provided by the Email Act.

The Complaint

contains no well-pled allegations, on information and belief or otherwise, that Defendant
(i) knew of Plaintiffs residency prior to sending the allegedly offending email, (ii)
knowingly or intentionally targeted Utah residents with its allegedly offending email
advertisement, (iii) actively solicited or engaged in business in Utah, or (iv) had any other
contact, significant or otherwise, with Utah. The absence of such allegations renders the
Complaint deficient as a matter of law for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction,
and this alone is sufficient to affirm the district court's ruling.
Moreover, Defendant's own affidavit, uncontested by Plaintiff in all relevant
respects, directly controverts any claims of jurisdiction, establishing that Defendant (i) is

Although Plaintiff attempts to rely on Utah's long-arm statute to support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, the statute is not even cited in the Complaint.
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not a resident of Utah, (ii) maintains no registered agent in Utah, (iii) owns no property in
Utah, (iv) has no employees, offices or agents in Utah, (v) has no shareholders who reside
in Utah, (vi) maintains no phone or facsimile listings within Utah, (vii) does not actively
market or advertise in Utah or actively solicit Utah residents, (viii) does not send sales or
customer service agents into Utah, (ix) does not pay taxes in Utah, (x) maintains no bank
accounts or other financial arrangements in Utah, (xi) does not use a Utah based server to
support its passive website, and (xii) does not otherwise engage in business in or seek the
protection of the laws of Utah. The only piece of evidence that Plaintiff relies upon to
support his claim of jurisdiction is a lone email advertising Defendant's website, an email
which apparently made its way across the vast expanses of the Internet and into the email
account of Plaintiff, a Utah resident. This, without more, can not make out a prima facie
case for personal jurisdiction. See SH Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives
Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 436 (Utah 1998) (emphasizing that personal jurisdiction is not
found on "isolated or occasional transactions"); Soma Med., 196 F. 3d at 1299 (fact that
plaintiff resides in jurisdiction is "of no consequence" where there is no indication that
"Utah had anything but a fortuitous role" in the parties' relationship).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD
NOT ASSERT PERSONAL JURISDICTION AGAINST DEFEND ANT.
It is undisputed that the test set forth in State ex rel. W.A., 2002 UT 127, 63 P.2d

607, controls this case, and that personal jurisdiction may be found only if it is granted by
Utah statute and comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

See id at f 14. Neither of these

requirements have been met in this case.
A.

There is No Statutory Basis to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Against
Defendant in this Case.

Plaintiff asserts that personal jurisdiction is authorized by both the Email Act and
Utah's long-arm statute. He is wrong in both respects.
1.

The Email Act Confers Standing, Not Jurisdiction.

In support of his contention that the Email Act confers personal jurisdiction,
Plaintiff relies entirely upon Section 13-36-105, which states, in relevant part, that a civil
enforcement action may be brought by any "person who received the unsolicited
commercial email." Plaintiff argues that for there to be an action, there must also be
jurisdiction. This argument distorts basic principles of American jurisprudence.
Section 13-36-105 does one thing and one thing only: confer standing to sue upon
any person who receives an offending email. It does not give the courts of this State the
power to hear any case against any defendant, or provide that any defendant who violates
the Email Act's regulatory provisions automatically subjects itself to personal jurisdiction
in this State. Like many substantive statutes, the Email Act is completely silent on the
issue of jurisdiction. The logical inference from such silence is that the statue is limited
to establishing a cause of action against those who violate the substantive requirements,
but only insofar as the court can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.

606802.2

17

Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the fact that a private cause of action exists
under Utah law does not mean that it may always be pursued in a Utah forum. Such a
standard would eviscerate the very protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment
and the personal jurisdiction doctrine. This does not hinder the enforcement of the
statute, as Plaintiff would suggest. See Plaintiff's Brief at 17 ("If neither the spam statute
nor the state's long-arm statute provide jurisdiction, there is simply no possibility of
enforcing the legislature's remedy for the spam problem."). A Utah resident receiving an
offending email can sue under the Email Act in any court that actually has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. In this case, for instance, Plaintiff could potentially file
suit against Defendant in Nevada (its place of incorporation) or California (its principal
place of business).4 The fact that this may not be the most convenient forum for Plaintiff
does not provide a basis to read a personal jurisdiction provision into the Email Act.
2.

Utah's Long Arm Statute Does Not Apply.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this State
under Utah's long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-24, because it transacted business
and/or caused tortious "injury" within this State. See Plaintiff's Brief at 9. Neither of
these provisions apply.

4

As evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff's counsel has brought more than 1200 cases
under the Email Act, only a handful of which have been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, claims may also be brought in Utah against any defendant actually subject to
personal jurisdiction in this State.

a.

Defendant Did Not Transact Business Within this State.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant transacted business within Utah, for purposes of
Utah's long-arm statute, because a lone e-mail, arguably commercial in nature, made its
way across the vast expanses of the Internet and into the e-mail account of a Utah
resident. See Plaintiffs Brief at 9-10. Plaintiff cites no case law in support of his
position. Even considering the liberal and expansive construction traditionally granted
Section 78-27-24(1), see Synergenics v. Marathon Racing Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110
(Utah 1985), his assertions stretch the bounds of reasonableness and threaten to vastly
expand the scope and reach of Utah's long-arm statute.
Plaintiffs arguments are based largely on the assumption that Defendant had some
way of knowing the residency of the holder of the email address, or sent the email with
the specific intent to target Utah residents or initiate business within this State. See
Plaintiffs Brief at 10. There is absolutely no evidence of such intentional conduct on the
record, however, either in Plaintiffs Complaint or his affidavit. There is likewise no
allegation that the email in question, or any similar email, actually resulted in any
business or contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, or between
Defendant and any other Utah resident. Compare Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.
Supp. 1123, 1126 (D. Utah 1986) (defendant transacted business within the state for
purposes of the Utah long-arm statute when he "telephoned [the plaintiff in Utah] and
personally contracted for" the plaintiff to provide future services to him in Nevada).
To the contrary, Defendant specifically denies having any business association in
Utah or with any Utah resident. The uncontested affidavit of Defendant makes clear that
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it does not advertise in Utah, does not particularly solicit Utah residents to view its
website, does not send agents into Utah to conduct business, sell products or services, or
visit customers, and does not otherwise engage in business within this State. Even
accepting all of the facts alleged in the Complaint and Plaintiff's affidavit as true for
purposes of this motion, the most that can be established is that Defendant, through the
services of a third-party, used the medium of email to advertise and promote its passive
website, and that a lone email happened to make its way to the email address of a Utah
resident. Such isolated and fortuitous conduct, without more, does not constitute the
transaction of business within this State for purposes of Utah's long-arm statute.
b.

No Tortious Injury Occurred Within this State.

As a threshold matter, the Email Act is a regulatory statute; it does not establish a
claim in tort. Cf. Prince v. Bear River MuL Ins., 2002 UT 68, f 47, 56 P.3d 524 ("Where
a statute provides a specific legal remedy to redress an injury in violation of the statute, a
tort action for violation of the public policy embodied in the statute will not lie."). As
such, Section 78-27-24(3) has no application in this case. Moreover, the Email Act does
not recognize the existence of any actual "injury" to the recipient of the email. It simply
requires the initiator to comply with the statutory requirements or face civil penalties.
These civil penalties are not provided to redress an actual injury to the recipient, but to
provide a mechanism and incentive for civil enforcement. For these reasons, this prong
of the long-arm statute does not apply to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant in
this case.

B.

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Would Violate its
Rights to Due Process.

To satisfy the constraints of due process, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant
has "'minimum contacts with [Utah] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT
5, f 8, 980 P.2d 204, 206 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (further quotations omitted)). The analysis is two-pronged. The first requires
a showing that the "defendant corporation has 'purposefully availed1 itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state" such that "[it] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there." Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659,
662 (Utah 1989) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, AAA U.S. 286, 297
(1980); Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (emphasis added). The second
requires a showing that the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable under the
particular circumstances involved, balancing "'the convenience of the parties' and
weighing] the forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction." Anderson, 807 P.2d at 828
(quoting Mallory Eng'g, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah
1980)).
Plaintiff contends that minimum contacts can be established by the mere fortuitous
transmission of an email to the email account of a Utah resident, regardless of whether
Defendant actually intended to target Utah residents or develop a business relationship
within Utah, and despite the lack of evidence that Defendant had any contacts with Utah
or any significant commercial relationship with any other Utah resident. Defendant urges
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this Court to take a more reasonable and practical approach, and to affirm the district
court's ruling that Defendant's lone email to Plaintiff does not subject it to personal
jurisdiction in this State. Cf. Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1007 (state may not "make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties or relations").
L

Defendant Does Not Have Sufficient Minimum Contacts with
Utah to Have Purposefully Availed Itself of the Privilege of
Conducting Activities in this State*

"To determine whether a nonresident defendant had sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state to justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction over him or her, [the
court] must look to 'the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to each
other

'" Starways, 980 P.2d at 207 (quoting Parry, 779 P.2d at 662). "Purposeful

availment requires actions by the defendant which 'create a substantial connection with
the forum state.'" Omi Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir.
1998).5

"'[A] defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of

"random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts.'" (Access, Inc. v. Webcard Tech., Inc.,
182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. Utah 2002) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
All U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). In other words, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant
"engaged in activity that [was] 'expressly aimed' or 'intentionally directed' at Utah
residents." Id. (quoting Asahi Metals Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
112(1987)).
5

In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Utah courts apply federal law. See State ex rel. W.A., 2002 UT 127 at f 19.

Plaintiff argues that this burden has been met in this case because the email
Plaintiff received from Defendant was an "obvious solicitation!] to do business."
Plaintiffs Brief at 12. What Plaintiff does not and cannot establish, however, is that
Defendant knew or had any reason to know that the recipient was a Utah resident, or
actively and purposefully targeted the subject email or any of its other business activities
to the residents of this State. Plaintiff likewise fails to establish that Defendant actively
solicited other Utah residents, via the disputed email or otherwise,6 or took any other
affirmative action to form a "substantial" business relationship or presence within the
state. Indeed, the most Plaintiff can establish is that defendant sent a single email to
golfyx@delaware.com, and that this email address happened to belong to a Utah resident.
This is the very type of random and fortuitous connection to Utah that the courts have
routinely rejected. See iAccess, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1186; Romney v. St. John Virgin
Grand Villas Assocs., 734 R Supp. 957 (D. Utah 1990).
iAccess, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, is particularly instructive. There, iAccess, a Utah
corporation, sued WEBcard, a California corporation, to have one of WEBcard's patents
declared invalid. In responding to WEBcard's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, iAccess asserted that WEBcard "purposefully directed activity at Utah

Throughout his opening brief, Plaintiff refers to "emails" and "solicitations," using the
plural form of these words to suggest that Defendant sent multiple email messages to
residents of this State. The record contains only one email, however, and there is no
evidence to suggest that any Utah resident other than Plaintiff received the allegedly
offending email. Although the Complaint hints at a class action, see Complaint at 2, f 6,
Record at 2, no class allegations were actually made, and no class certification was ever
sought. Plaintiff likewise makes no allegation of multiple emails in his affidavit.
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residents by constructing and operating an interactive website" that allowed "users to
email WEBcard or to subscribe to mailing lists." Id. at 186-87. The court granted
WEBcard's motion to dismiss, focusing on the fact that WEBcard's connection to Utah
were insubstantial, infrequent and, at best, fortuitous:
For this court to exercise personal jurisdiction, WEBcard
must have purposefully directed activities at Utah. WEBcard
did maintain a website that allowed interaction with users, but
mere interactivity will not support jurisdiction. Rather,
iAccess must allege a nexus between WEBcard's website and
Utah residents, iAccess offers only that WEBcard made one
$20.00 sale to a Utah resident. No evidence exists, however,
that links this one sale to a Utah resident to the website.
Moreover, no evidence exists that a single Utah resident has
visited the website. Here WEBcard "has 'consummated no
transaction' and has made 'no deliberate and repeated'
contacts with Utah through its Web site [sic]. . . . Without
such proof this court may not exercise personal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).
As in iAccess, there is absolutely no evidence (or even allegation) that Defendant
actively and purposefully targeted its email solicitation at Utah residents, no evidence (or
even allegation) that the subject email resulted in any actual business transaction within
this State, and no evidence (or even allegation) that Defendant has made a "deliberate and
repeated" effort to contact or solicit Utah residents. The mere receipt of one e-mail by
Plaintiff within this State, without more, does not demonstrate the type of "substantial
connection" required under the Fourteenth Amendment, and is not sufficient to subject
Defendant to litigation in this forum.

Plaintiffs reliance on Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, is intriguing because that case actually
support's Defendant's claim that no personal jurisdiction exists.7 Asahi held that placing
a product into the stream of interstate commerce, without more, does not establish
minimum contacts with the state where that product ends up. Id. at 107; see also Parry,
779 P.2d at 667 (mere possibility that a product placed into the stream of commerce
might make its way to Utah is insufficient to subject defendant to personal jurisdiction).
Put another way, Asahi stands for the proposition that personal jurisdiction will not lie
where a defendant places a product into the stream of interstate commerce and that
product, without any knowing, intentional or purposeful conduct by the defendant,
happens to make its way into the forum state.
Defendant's act of placing an email into the vast expanses of the Internet is akin to
placing a product in the stream of interstate commerce. See iAccess, 182 F. Supp. 2d at
1187 (quoting Bensusan Rest Corp, v. King, 37 F. Supp. 2d 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
affd 126 F.3d 25 (2Qd Cir. 1997)) ('"Creating a [passive] site, like placing a product into
the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without
more, is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.'"). Without some
evidence that Defendant knowingly, intentionally or purposefully targeted the email at

Plaintiff relies upon Asahi for the proposition that an advertisement in the forum state
may support a finding of minimum contacts. See Plaintiff's Brief at 12-13. Asahi
specifically held, however, that this is but one factor the court can consider in the overall
analysis. 480 U.S. at 107. Indeed, courts have long recognized that a single
advertisement unwittingly sent into the jurisdiction is insufficient to sustain a claim of
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lee v. Frank's Garage & Used Cars, 2004 UT App 260,
f 11, 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (recognizing that minimum contacts is not established by
"an advertisement placed in a national. . . . magazine").
606802 2

25

residents of Utah, personal jurisdiction should not be found. Compare with Romney, 734
F. Supp. at 962 (emphasis added) (personal jurisdiction found where defendant
"intentionally contracted [a Utah resident] knowing breach of the contract would injure
[plaintiff] in Utah....").
The only case cited by Plaintiff that even potentially supports his claim of
jurisdiction is Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
While this case apparently holds that the sending of a lone email might be enough to
establish minimum contacts, it does so without any substantive analysis, on a bold theory
of sender beware. See Plaintiffs Brief at 15 (citing Internet Doorway, 138 F. Supp. at
779-80). This theory is not supported by any other known case law, however, and is not
consistent with long standing principles of minimum contacts. See, e.g., iAccess 182 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187 (fact that conduct "may be felt nationwide—or even worldwide" not
sufficient to sustain finding of personal jurisdiction); Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46
F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 1995) (mere foreseeability not enough to establish personal
jurisdiction).

The adoption of such a theory would eviscerate the long standing

requirement that a defendant engage in some type of purposeful conduct to knowingly
reach into the state and thereby avail itself of the benefits and protections of its laws.
See, e.g. Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1008 n. 15 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957)); Far West II, 46 F.3d at 1075. This Court should therefore reject

There is at least some suggestion that the sender of the email in Internet Doorway had
knowledge of the states to which the email was sent, see 138 F.Supp 2d at 775, a critical
distinction from this case

the holding of Internet Doorways, stand behind its long recognized principles of
minimum contacts, and hold that unintentional and unknowing transmission of an
isolated email to an address which fortuitously belongs to a Utah resident, standing alone,
will not give rise to personal jurisdiction.
In sum, Defendant's contacts with Utah consist of one isolated email unknowingly
sent to an email address that just so happened to belong to a Utah resident. Such an
isolated and fortuitous contact does not evidence that Defendant "purposefully availed"
itself of the protections and benefits of the laws of this State, and does not establish
sufficient minimum contacts to support the constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
2.

It Would Offend Traditional Notions of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice to Subject Defendant to Suit in Utah,

Regardless of whether Defendant established minimum contacts in Utah, it would
be unreasonable and offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to

9

The other cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable and do not support personal
jurisdiction. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-67 (6th Cir. 1996)
(exercising personal jurisdiction where Texas-based defendant not only communicated
with the plaintiff's computer system via e-mail, but affirmatively entered into contracts
with the Ohio-based plaintiff and actively and repeatedly used its Ohio-based server to
affirmatively market its software products to residents in Ohio and elsewhere); American
Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglassess & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 902-03
(N.D. Tex. 2000) (exercising personal jurisdiction where non-resident defendant admitted
that it was attempting to "reach every person, including Texans" and used its website to
"regularly sell products to Texas customers" and thereby establish "a retail presence in
Texas"); Starmedia Network, Inc. v. Star Media, Inc., Case No. 00 CIV 4647(DLC), 2001
WL 417118 at *1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added) (exercising personal jurisdiction
where non-resident defendant admitted that one of the purposes behind its website was to
"attract new customers, including customers from New York," and defendant had
"additional contacts with New York").
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require Defendant to appear in this suit. In analyzing this prong of the analysis courts are
required to balance "'the convenience of the parties' and forum's interest in
jurisdiction.'" Anderson, 807 P.2d at 828 (quoting Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1008). "While
not dispositive, the burden on the defendant of litigating the case in a foreign forum is of
primary concern . . . , because [this factor] serves to prevent the filing of vexatious claims
in a distant forum where the burden of appearing is onerous." Id This factor becomes
particularly important where the "plaintiff's claim is relatively small" and defendant may
therefore be "financially compelled to default." See Nova, 648 F. Supp. at 1127. See
also Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1009 ("[TJhe inconvenience to the nonresident must be viewed
in relation to the importance of the conflict litigated, which, in a commercial setting, is
evidenced by the amount in controversy. If the amount is trivial in comparison to the
expense of litigating in the foreign forum and the possibility of the defendant defaulting
reaches sufficient proportions, the demands of fair play and substantial justice dictate the
reservation of the state's jurisdictional power.").
This case alleges a single violation of the Email Act, carrying a maximum
statutory penalty of $10.00.

Plaintiff's potential damages in this case are therefore

nominal, particularly in comparison to the obvious expense Defendant would incur
litigating this case in this State. As a result, Defendant would likely be compelled to
either default, confess judgment or enter into an outrageous and unfair settlement.
Plaintiff's interest in relief is therefore significantly outweighed by the potential burden
on Defendant, and this factor weighs heavily against the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in this case.

Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that Utah has a strong interest in "adjudicating
disputes" arising under the Email Act, and that this interest outweighs any burden on
Defendant. See Plaintiff's Brief at 17. Any interest Utah may have had in adjudicating
disputes under the Email Act, however, has been significantly diminished by the repeal of
the Email Act in May 2004. This factor should therefore carry little if any weight in the
overall analysis, and does not outweigh the significant burden on Defendant.
In sum, the burden on Defendant of litigating this case in this State is significant
and outweighs not only the Plaintiffs minimal claims, but also this State's minimal
interest in enforcing the now repealed Email Act. On balance, even if minimum contacts
can somehow be established, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would
be inconsistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," and violate
Defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 56(F).
The district court concluded that the relief afforded by Rule 56(f) applies only to

motions for summary judgment brought or decided under Rule 56, and has no application
to motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction brought and decided under Rule
12(b)(2). See Mem. Decision at 6, R. 96. This conclusion is entirely consistent with
Utah law. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, f 20 (Rule 56(f) not applicable to
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motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l)-(5)).

On this basis alone, the

district court's ruling should be affirmed.
In any event, the district court properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish
a sufficient need for discovery in this case. Utah law is clear that a motion filed pursuant
to Rule 56(f) must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth (i) the type of discovery
sought, (ii) how such discovery might impact the pending motion, and (iii) why the
movant cannot adequately respond to the motion without further discovery. See Sandy
City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev 'd in part on other
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992); Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT
App. 397, f 14, 38 P.3d 984, 990. Where no such showing is made, the district court
properly exercises its discretion in denying the motion. See, e.g., Campbell, 2001 UT
App. at f l 11 & 14, 38 P.3d at 989-90. ll

Plaintiff does not even challenge this ruling on appeal. Instead, he attempts to
characterize Defendant's motion as a motion for summary judgment actually decided
under Rule 56. See Plaintiffs Brief at 18-19 (setting forth the standards for granting or
denying a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c)). Plaintiff apparently believes
that because the district court considered the affidavit of Mr. Gautereaux in granting
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Defendant's motion must have been converted to a
motion for summary judgment. Utah law is clear, however, that trial courts may properly
consider affidavits in ruling on 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss, see Anderson, 807 P.2d at
827 (trial court "may determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone"), and that such affidavits
do not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Wheeler,
2002 UT 16 at f 20 (rule converting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into
motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 does not apply to motions to dismiss
brought under Rule 12(b)(l)-(5), even where affidavits or other evidence is admitted and
considered).
11

Defendant recognizes that regardless of whether Rule 56(f) applies, a district court has
the discretion to allow a plaintiff limited discovery where it has reason to believe that
such discovery is necessary to determine the jurisdictional issues. See Anderson, 807

Neither the pleadings filed in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule
56(0 nor the untimely affidavit of Plaintiffs counsel provides the required information.12
Plaintiffs counsel made it clear in his own affidavit that discovery was sought not to
challenge Mr. Gautereaux assertions that Defendant did not have any contacts with or
conduct any business within the State of Utah, but to examine Mr. Gautereaux about his
statements that Defendant only authorized the sending of emails to those who had given
express permission or had a preexisting business relationship with Defendant or its
affiliates, to further explore Defendant's email solicitation practices, and to "find out the
source of the email lists used by Defendant" Affidavit of Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. at 2, ff
5-8, Record at 72. While all of these issues are arguably relevant to the underlying merits
of Plaintiffs Email Act claim,13 the district court properly concluded that this
information "does not relate to [the] personal jurisdiction of Defendant." Mem. Decision

P.2d at 827 (trial court "may . . . permit discovery or hold an evidentiary hearing"). Such
discovery is appropriate, however, only where the plaintiff first makes out a prima facie
case of jurisdiction, and establishes, via affidavit or otherwise, that the discovery sought
will actually assist it in responding to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff neither
made out a prima facie case, see supra Section I, nor established how the requested
discovery would materially assist it in responding to Defendant's motion to dismiss. As
such, even if Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f) could somehow be construed
as a motion for an order allowing limited discovery under Rule 12(b)(2), the district court
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to allow such discovery in this case.
Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss likewise fails to adequately
explain the type of discovery sought or how that discovery will actually help to defeat
Defendant's motion. See R. 33-39.
The giving of permission to receive an email or the existence of a preexisting business
relationship between the sender and the recipient of an email are complete defenses to
liability under the Email Act.
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at 7, R. 97. The district court therefore properly exercised its discretion in denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f), and this Court should affirm.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for the courts of this State to exercise personal jurisdiction
against Defendant in the case. As a threshold matter, neither the Email Act itself nor
Utah's long-arm statute grants personal jurisdiction. Even if a statutory basis exists,
however, an exercise of jurisdiction would violate Defendant's due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court correctly concluded that Rule 56(f) simply does not apply to
motions to dismiss brought and decided under Rule 12(b)(2). In any event, the district
court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish (i)
what discovery was actually needed in this case, (ii) how that discovery was necessary to
defending against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or (iii) why it could not adequately
respond to Plaintiffs motion without such discovery, and in denying Plaintiffs Motion
for Relief under Rule 56(f).
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the district court's Memorandum Decision
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief Under Rule 56(f) should be affirmed.
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RAi
MICHAEL P. PED&OGEORGE
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Celebrity Cruises, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this OU day of August, 2004, I caused to be mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, to:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
Jesse L. Riddle
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES
11778 South Election Drive, Suite 240
Draper, Utah 84020

^

/

^

/

^

.

APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM
1.

Complaint, dated January 21, 2003.

2.

Affidavit of Robert L. Gautercaux, dated May 23, 2003.

3.

Affidavit of Frank Amyx, dated June 8, 2003.

4.

MTidnil nt Oeuu'i < Simllei Ii , ii;ift .1 liihll), .'00 I

5.

Decision _...- Order Granting Defendant < Motion
Dismiss on
Jurisdictional (r.« usuls Hni>!u-s v. Cosmo.< om, hu.., Case No. 020411292
(3rd Dist., Sandy Dept. Apr. 4, 2003) (Judge Denise Posse Lindberg).

6.

Starmedia Network, Inc. v. Star Medio, ln< , < 'ase No 00 i 'l\' lol / < I »| t '),
2001 WL417118(S.D.N.Y. 2001).

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO. 1

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (#3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)576-1400
Facsimile: (801) 576-1960
Jesse L. Riddle (#6640)
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES, F.C.
11778 South Election Drive, Suite 240
Draper, Utah 84020-6808
Telephone: (801) 569-3100
Facsimile: (801) 569-8700
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

FRANKAMYX,
Plaintiff,

J
«

COMPLAINT

i

vs.

PLAYERS VACATION CLUB, INC. and
JOHN DOES one through ten whose true
names are unknown
Defendants

!
',
J

Civil No. o'^o'-/ O t ^> "2_a
Judge Denise Lindberg

'

Plaintiff, for cause of action against defendant, complain and allege as follows:
STATUTORY AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION and VENUE
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah.
2. Defendant(s) sends, or causes to be sent, unsolicited e-mails into the State of Utah.
3. John Does one (1) through ten (10) sent, or caused to be sent, unsolicited emails into the State
of Utah.
4. This action is brought, and this court has jurisdiction, pursuant to the statutory authority of
U.C.A. §13-36-101, et. seq., "Unsolicited Commercial Email Act".
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5.

Venue is ptopn m N;ill I ;il< r ('(unity, Si,tie- of 1 h.ili

6

As will be set out in Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification, if plaintiff seeks to certify a
class for otiiers similarly situated, this suit meets all elements of Rule 23.
F I R S T C A U S E OF AC I I O N V I O L A I I O N OF I J . C A . §13-36-101 e t seq.

7.

Defendant(s) sent, or caiiseci to be sent, to plaintiff an unsolicited e-mail as defined in
U.C.A. §13-36-102(3), and attached hereto as "Exhibit A"
i

8.

Said ' n *

9.

SJM

I

Defendant(s) failed to comply the "Requirements" set oui l i t A §13 -36-103.

II

Plaintiff is entitled to the greater of actual damages o> '• ' •* j §13-.*-

.

;

rCeommeu

.-.<.!

• -A [>\h^\

>•• '

.• . *r

. "unsolicited as deiiiiot in i J.C.A vM u. I02(8)(a) & (b).

= ..- /.!•!• i os!-. .i/i !

J-i)n«'it)R'aitorncy fees.

T H E R E F O R E , plaintiff, seeks judgment against defendant(s):
I/

For the sum of the greater of actual damages oi ^ i-i **o f\* -MC^ • niad sent;

I "I

Rf.ison.iH.

...i , i - ( . • *<.• {".-.

•«•: '

•

-

.

513-36-1 ()->uiHh.

If a class is certified, plaintiff reserves the right to amend this prayer for relief.

DATED January 21,2003.

z-~^\

/

R I M ) L E &/ A S S O C I A T E S , P C

Jesse LJBHddle
ARorne/s forP'"-"'
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EXHIBIT A
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2,

Jesse Riddle Laptop
From:

Frank or Aaron Amyx [golfyx@delwave.com]

Sent:

Wednesday, October 02, 2002 1:23 PM

To:
spam@recovery-usa.com
Subject: Fw: Need New Things? Guaranteed $5,000 Credit Line for all I ife's Needs

Original Message —
From: Great Specials
To: Friend
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 6:56 AM
Subject: Need New Things? Guaranteed $5,000 (jfdif I mi; foi .'ill I iff?\ Hrcnh

You are receiving these special offers because you signed up at one of our
partner sites.
You can remove yourself from this recurring list
by clicking her e to send a blank email to unsub-62413997-2404@mailtonic.net
OR
' Sending a postal mail to CustomerService, Box 202885, Austin, TX 78720
This message was sent to golfyx@deIwave.cow

'22/2002

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO

2mmy28

mii:Q1

RANDY L. DRYER (0924)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANK AMYX,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L.
GAUTEREAUX

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 030401320

PLAYERS VACATION CLUB, INC.,

Judge Denise Lindberg

Defendant.

I, Robert L. Gautereaux, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a resident of the state of California and am over eighteen years of age. I

make this affidavit based on my personal knowledge.
2.

I am the president of Players Vacation Club, Inc., which is a Defendant in the

above-entitled action.
3.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of

business in California.
financing for vacations.

CT>/JC/( I

Players Vacation Club is a membership club which provides credit

4.

Players Vacation club also does business as My Computer Club, which is a

membership club which provides credit financing for the purchase of computers.
5.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. is the owner of a website by the name of

MyComputerClub.com.

This website is a passive website which merely makes information

available to those who are interested in the information.
6.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not maintain a registered agent in Utah.

7.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not own, lease, or control any property, either

real or personal, in the State of Utah.
8.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not maintain any employees, offices, agents, or

bank accounts in the State of Utah.
9.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. is a closely held corporation and has no shareholders

who reside in Utah.
10.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. has no phofie or facsimile listings within the State of

11.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not market or advertise in Utah and does not

Utah.

particularly solicit Utah residents to view its website.
12.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not send agents into Utah to conduct business,

sell products, or visit customers.
13.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not pay taxes in Utah.

14.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. has no employees, and does not recruit employees in

Utah or any other state.

532454.1
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15.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. maintains no bank accounts or other financial

arrangements in the State of Utah.
16.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. engaged Venture Worldwide, Inc. to send out emails

like the one attached to.Plaintiffs Complaint to those recipients who had given permission to
receive commercial email. Venture Worldwide, Inc. represented to Players Vacation Club that it
would send email advertisements only to those who had given permission.
17.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. does not use a Utah Server to host its website, Rather,

Chris Rochell, Inc. uses an internet based server to host its website.
18.

Players Vacation Club, Inc. only sends emails to those persons who have given

permission to receive emails or otherwise have a pre-existing business or personal relationship
with Players Vacation Club, Inc.
DATED this *$_ day of May, 2003.

ROBE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

2

)
: ss.
)

On the S2^r
day of May, 2003, personally appeared before me Robert L. Gautereaux,
the signer of the foregoing Affidavit, and duly acknowledged to me that he read the same, that he
understands the contents thereof; and that he signed the same of his own free act. ^

SANMNTHAR^RA j N O T A ^ ? P r o B
w

~

.

.

My Commission

ST74S4 1

< £ K S K i $ ^ NOTARY PUBLIC-CALIFORNIAsg
_ *VS*3£m
COMM.NO. 1369606
i n
. ,.
Exranra&giW
SAN DIEGO COUNTY
B Residing
1 ^<$$g&/
MY COMM. EXP. AUG. 12,2006 I

-\

at:

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO. 3

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (#3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Facsimile: (801) 576-1960
Jesse L. Riddle (#6640)
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES
11778 South Election Drive, Suite 240
Draper, UT 84020-6808
Telephone: (801) 569-3100
Facsimile: (801) 569-8700
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

FRANK AMYX, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK AMYX

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 030401320
PLAYERS VACATION CLUB, INC., and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10.

Judge Denise Lindberg

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

1

COME NOW Frank Amyx and upon his oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am personally acquainted with all the facts set forth in this affidavit and, if called
upon to testify, can support these allegations.

2.

I am the plaintiff in the above entitled matter.

3.

I was in my home in Utah when I received the offending spam.

4.

I received the email spam solicitation attached to the Complaint and designated as
Exhibit A.

5.

A true and accurate copy of the unsolicited instant spam is attached to the Complaint.

6.

The spam email was commercial in nature and was unsolicited.

7.

The Affidavit of Robert Gautereaux contains many inaccuracies. For example,
paragraph 18 states: "Players Vacation Club, Inc. only sends emails to those persons
who have given permission to receive emails or otherwise have a pre-existing
business or personal relationship with Players Vacation Club, Inc." I did not give
my permission nor did I have a pre-existing business or personal relationship with
Players Vacation Club, Inc.

8.

Paragraph 17 of the Affidavit of Robert Gautereaux states: "Chris Rochelle, Inc. uses
an internet based server to host its website." The Defendant in this matter is not
Chris Rochelle, Inc. nor is it claimed to be an affiliate of the Defendant. It appears
to be a mistake as the Affidavit of Robert Gautereaux is a boiler plate affidavit that

-2-

has not been completely cleaned up from the last time it was used. Thus, the
incorrect naming of Defendant.
9.

I have never had any business or personal relationship with Players Vacation Club,
Inc., My Computer Club, or Venture Worldwide, Inc. nor do I want one.

10.

I did not register my personal information on Defendant's website, or request or
consent to receive commercial offers and solicitations or give my permission to
Defendant or any other third parties.

11.

I did not "opt-in" or affirmatively consent to receive information regarding
Defendant's products and services.

12.

On the date I received the unsolicited email I did not have a pre-exisiting business or
personal relationship with Defendant nor its marketing partners, afiliates and
advertisers.

13.

I did not request nor consent to receive promotional offers/messages via email at any
time from the Defendant or its affiliates; nor did I at anytime give permission to
receive commercial email at any time.

14.

I do not opt-in to receive third party spam emails for product and service
advertisements.

15.

In fact, I go to great lengths to avoid receiving unsolicited emails.

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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DATED this

9

day of June, 2003.

Frank
Amyx
ankAmyx

--—

{s*^^~

-™i2^^^
Notary Public
Sandra J.BerryhiB

^Ls_

10885 South State

Sandy, Utah 84070

NOTARY PUBLTC

Mv Commission Expires

September 30,2004
State of Utah,

SEEIIZICATEOIFSEE^
I hereby certify thar I am an employee of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & PotiJsen, P>C and that
I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid; faxed; and/or handdelivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
Randy Dryer
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O.Box45S98
SaltLafoe City, Utah 84145-1234
DATED this

Se
xxt via:
.Mail
. Facsimile
. Hand-delivery

3

ay ofJune, 2003.

UXJ
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"2^1

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO. 4

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (#3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Facsimile: (801) 576-1960
Jesse L. Riddle (#6640)
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
11778 South Election Drive, Suite 240
Draper, Utah 84020-6808
Telephone: (801) 569-3100
Facsimile: (801) 569-8700
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

FRANK AMYX, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENVER C.
SNUFFER, JR.

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 030401320

PLAYERS VACATION CLUB, INC., and
John Does 1 through 10.

Judge Denise Lindberg

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COME NOW Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and upon his oath deposes and says as follows:

1

I am personally acquainted with all the facts set forth in this affidavit and, if called
upon to testify, can support these allegations.
I am counsel of record in the above entitled matter.
I am submitting this affidavit pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56 (f).
Defendant has supplied an affidavit by Robert Gautereaux which statements have
been disputed by Plaintiff.
Robert Gautereaux's deposition is needed to further question his statements made
concerning "..to those recipients who had given permission to receive commercial
email." This statement has been directly refuted by Plaintiff.
Robert Gautereaux's deposition is needed to further question his statement made
concerning: "...only sends emails to those persons who have given permission to
receive emails or otherwise have a pre-existing business or personal relationship with
Players Vacation Club, Inc." Again, Plaintiff disputes these allegations and oral
testimony is required.
Robert Gautereaux's deposition is needed to further question his statements
concerning his solicitation via email practices. The Mr. Rochelle does not deny
having ever sent unsolicited email into the state of Utah.
Further discovery is also needed to find out the source of the email lists used by
Defendant and the means to which the names and addresses were gathered or
acquired.
For the above mentioned reasons, additional discovery is needed to oppose
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
-2-

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

DATED this

N
* *
?

1°

day of July, 2003.

Notary Pubhc
Sanr HraJ Bcrryhill
tC . " C r i s t a t e
Z-*& *• "^ 8*070
. r . -~ - : -Expires

Denver

fer, Jr.

—Oirthis / ' day ot July, z003, personally appeared affiant before me, a Notary Public in
and for said County and State, who acknowledged that he executed the above instrument

NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am an employee of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. and that
I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid; faxed; and/or handdelivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
Randy Dryer
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
DATED this 10th day of July, 200J-

Sent via:

VlMail
7V

Facsimile
Hand-delivery

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO. 5

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

v

7 -£ >

CRAIG HUGHES,
Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

vs.
COSMO.COM, INC, and JOHN DOES
one through ten whose true names are
unknown,
Defendants.

Case No. 020411292
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

Tf 1
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cosmo.Com, Inc. ("Cosmo")'s Motion to
Dismiss filed January 28, 2003. Defendant brings its Motion under Utah R_ Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2)
asserting lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant's Motion is supported by
affidavit filed by Charles "Cosmo" Wilson, President of Defendant Cosmo ("Wilson"). Plaintiff
filed his Opposition on February 10, 2003. The Opposition memorandum is not supported by
affidavit. Defendant replied on February 24, 2003. A Notice to Submit was filed February
26,2003.
1J2
At the time it filed its Motion Defendant requested oral argument pursuant to Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 4-501(3)(B). Plaintiffs Opposition did not request argument. Having thoroughly
reviewed the parties' memoranda the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary in that
the dispositive issues governing the granting of this Motion have been authoritatively decided.
Accordingly, Defendant's request for oral argument is DENIED, but its Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
$3
Plaintiff is a Utah resident who has brought this action on behalf of himself and other
allegedly similarly situated Utah residents, alleging that Cosmo has violated Utah's Unsolicited
Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §13-36-101 to -105 (2002) (the "Act").
f4
Among other things the Act requires that u[e]ach person who sends or causes to be sent
an unsolicited commercial email... to an email address held by a resident of the state shall" take
-1-

certain actions to identify itself and the advertising nature of the message sent. Specifically, the
Act imposes certain requirements on unsolicited commercial email messages1 and authorizes a
civil cause of action for violation of the Act's requirements. §13-36-105.
^J5
Defendant Cosmo is a Florida S-Corporation. Cosmo.com is also the name of a website.
Both the corporation and website are operated by Wilson.
1}6
Wilson's affidavit in support of the present Motion states that he established and maintains
Cosmo's website The website is not advertised "through any paid or concerted advertising
campaign in Utah or any other state." Affidavit of Charles "Cosmo" Wilson, fllO [hereinafter
"Affidavit"]. Cosmo "does not send, and has not sent or caused to be sent, any unsolicited
commercial emails into the personal email accounts of any person." Id at 1|11. The affidavit
affirms that the website is "advertised" only by word of mouth. Id at ^12. To defray the costs of
the website Cosmo allows other companies to place ads on its website, and receives a fee from
those entities. Id at ^[13-16. Plaintiff has notfileda counter-affidavit challenging any of the
facts provided by Wilson in his affidavit.
\l
Although Plaintiff's Complaint argues generally that Defendant "caused unsolicited
commercial emails to be sent to and received by plaintiff " Complaint, ^5, and that the allegedly
unsolicited email did not comport with statutory requirements, Id at T|20, Plaintiff does not
specifically state he received an unsolicited commercial email from Cosmo. Rather, Plaintiff
apparently alleges that a "pop-up" advertisement/coupon for a free Scrabble CD-ROM found on
Cosmo's own website constitutes an "unsolicited commercial email" within the meaning of the
Act. Notably, Plaintiff has not contradicted Wilson's assertion that the Scrabble ad/coupon was
located in Defendant's website. Plaintiff also has not disputed Wilson's statement that to view the
ad/coupon for the free Scrabble game, Plaintiff had to intentionally access the Cosmo website and,
once there, download and/or print a copy of the ad.
%8
In addition to the facts given in the affidavit concerning the Scrabble ad/coupon at issue in
this case, the Affidavit also states that Cosmo (a) is not licensed to do business in Utah, (b) does
not maintain a registered agent in Utah, (c) does not own, lease or control any property in Utah,
(d) does not maintain any employees, offices, agents or bank accounts in Utah, (e) has no Utah
shareholders, (f) has no phone or [fax] listings in Utah, (g) does not particularly solicit Utah
residents to view its website, (h) does not conduct business, sell products or visit customers in
Utah, (i) has no Utah shareholders, (j) does not pay taxes in Utah, (k) does not use a Utah server
to host its website. Affidavit at HT|23-31, 37-40.
1J9
Finally, Wilson personally has only made four brief trips to Utah between 1997 and the
present, none in connection with Cosmo but rather as a lighting designer for 3 or 4 concerts by

For example, the Act requires that senders include certain truthful information in its email, prohibits the
use of certain misleading practices, and requires the sender to provide a mechanism allowing recipients to
"unsubscribe'1 with respect to future email messages. Utah Code §13-36-103.
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touring rock groups who had brief stop-overs in Utah. Wilson has no family or closefriendsin
Utah. Affidavit at flf 32-36, 41.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1(10 Under Utah law, Plaintiff must make a prima facie case for assertion of jurisdiction over
Defendant in order to proceed to trial on the merits. Anderson v. American Soc 'y of Plastic &
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990). The Court may determine jurisdiction on
affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. If, as here, the Court proceeds
on documentary evidence alone, Plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true unless
specifically controverted by the Defendant's affidavit. Any disputes in the documentary evidence
are resolved in Plaintiffs favor, and the Court may not weigh the evidence. Id at 827.
ANALYSIS
%\ 1 Here, Plaintiff has rested on the very general factual allegations made in his Complaint,
unsupported by affidavit. "[Ojnly the well pled facts of plaintiffs complaint, as distinguished
from mere conclusory allegations must be accepted as true." PurCo Fleet Serv., Inc. v. Towers,
38 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1323 (D. Utah 1999) (quoting Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505
(10th Cir. 1995)(citations omitted). Moreover, "when jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot
solely rely on allegations ofjurisdiction in its complaint in the face of an affidavit by defendant
which specifically contradicts those general allegations/' Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610
P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980). Defendant has directly controverted Plaintiffs general allegations by way
of affidavit. The Court has relied on Wilson's uncontroverted affidavit.
|12
The Complaint's sole allegations with respect to jurisdiction are that "Defendant conducts
a portion of its business by sending unsolicited emails into the State of Utah," Complaint, p.2,1}2,
and that because "Defendant has caused unsolicited commercial e-mails to be sent to and received
by plaintiff.. .within the State of Utah, therefore, the courts of the State . . . have jurisdiction
over this matter. . rid at 1|5.
TJ13 In Opposition to Defendant's present Motion, Plaintiff further alleges, without evidentiary
support, that Defendant has transacted business within the State by:
attempting] to obtain new Utah customers. We believe that he already engages in
sales within Utah . . . . Even if not already conducting business, Defendant has
caused injury to the plaintiff, as evidenced by the violation of the [Act], This
should be enough to place him within the reach of the long-arm statute.
Additionally, the placement of the offending email was entirely commercially
driven and meant to transact business within the state. This, alternatively, should
be enough to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction within this state.
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Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at p. I1
fll4 The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to carry the minimal burden of
establishing a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. On this basis the Court concludes that
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction must be granted. Alternatively, as
explained below, the Court concludes that Utah law does not confer personal jurisdiction over
Defendant, either under the Act or under Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code §78-27-34. In the
absence of authorizing Utah law granting specific personal jurisdiction, the Court need not reach
the question whether attempting to assert such jurisdiction would violate fundamental due process
guarantees.
1(15 The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the law on assertion of specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.3 In determining whether such jurisdiction exists, this
Court must first assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
[Djefendant. If Utah law confers such personal jurisdiction, the Court must then determine
whether the assertion ofjurisdiction comports with constitutional due process requirements. State
ex rel WA., 2002 UT 127 \ 14 (emphasis in original).
\\6
The Court cannot agree with Plaintiffs contention that the Act provides for exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Unlike other provisions of Utah law in which the
legislature has expressly authorized the exercise of such jurisdiction, see, e.g., Utah Code §78-3a110(13), the Act is silent with respect to jurisdiction. The logical inference is that the Act is
limited to establishing a cause of action against those who violate its substantive requirements, but
only to the extent that the Court can properly exercise personaljurisdiction over such
defendants.
%il Since the Act itself does not confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, the Court
must look to Utah's long-arm statute to see if it reaches the conduct of which Plaintiff complains.
Utah's long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, provides, in relevant part:
Any person... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits . . .to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related to:

2

T)xt Court notes that Plaintiffs Complaint, as well as his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, are
virtually identical in most relevant respects to the pleadings which these same plaintiffs' counsel have filed in over
1200 other cases. It is evident that counsel have prepared and filed "one size fits air-type pleadings with minimal
tailoring suited to the specifics of this or any other case.
Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant has conducted such substantial and continued local activity so as
to be subject to general personal jurisdiction. Thus, the issue here is whether there is specific personal jurisdiction
over Defendant "Specific personal jurisdiction is the concept applicable to a long-arm statute..." Abbott GM.
Diesel v. Piper Aircraft. 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978) (quoting Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah,
1977 Utah L, Rev. 235, 264). When specific personal jurisdiction is asserted, it must be founded on claims arising
out of the specific activities provided for under the long-arm statute
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(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty... (emphasis added).
%\% On the facts of this case the Court concludes that Defendant's placement of passive ads
for other companies' products/services on its own website, which was purposefully accessed by
Plaintiff, does not meet either of the above-cited provisions of our long-arm statute. To the
extent that Plaintiffs generic jurisdictional claims can be construed to suggest that Defendant
transacted business in this state as a result of its website, the Court rejects that argument. In
reaching this conclusion the Court applies the well-reasoned and widely-adopted analysis oi Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).4 Under the
Zippo analysis, the facts of this case most closely resemble the second category described by that
court. As such, it does not form the basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court
further concludes that the minimal contacts between Cosmo's principal and Utah, supra %9, are
completely unrelated to Plaintiffs claim, and therefore do not form a basis for long-arm
jurisdiction over Defendant.
1J19
As to Plaintiffs allegations that he's suffered "injury" because he viewed an unsolicited
commercial email, the Act does not recognize any level of "injury" on the part of the recipient of
an email; rather it merely requires the initiator of such an email comply with statutory
requirements or face civil penalties.5 The Court is not persuaded that a violation of this regulatory
requirement rises to the level of a tort within the meaning of the long-arm statute. Cf Prince v.
Bear River Mut. Ins., 2002 UT 68 ^[47 ("Where a statute provides a specific civil legal remedy to

*The Zippo court analyzed three general categories, or factual contexts, along a "sliding scale," as a
means of evaluating jurisdiction based on Internet activity. Thefirstcategory involves those circumstances when
"a defendant clearly does business over the Internet," such as entering into contracts requiring the "knovwng and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet." 952 F. Supp. At 1123-24. At the opposite end of the
scale is a category involving cases where the exercise of personal jurisdiction is not appropriate, because the
Internet activity at issue involves "[aJ passive Web site that does little more than make information available to
those who are interested in it." Id Under those circumstances "a defendant has simply posted information on an
Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions." Id. Finally, the Zippo court identified a
third, middle, category that encompasses "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the
host computer." Id The cornl went on to conclude that determining whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is
appropriate depends upon "the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site." Id
Specifically, the statute requires those who "send[] or cause to be sent" unsolicited commercial emails to
comply with the statutory requirements. Since the statute does not define the term "send" or "sender,"under
standard rules of construction the Court looks to the usual and ordinary meaning of the word. According to
Webster's New World Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.), relevant definitions include "to dispatch, convey or transmit; to
arrange for the going of; to cause or force to move." The common thread of these definitions is that the ''sender" is
the one who exercises the initiative to communicate or transmit. In the present context, it would be the person who
initiated the various electronic transfers. In fact, it could be argued that by going to, and downloading from, the
Defendant's website the allegedly problematic pop-up ad, Plaintiff was the initiator in this case and could be liable
under the same law he has tried to sue under.
-5-

redress an injury in violation of that statute, a tort action for violation of the public policy
embodied in the statute will not lie"). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs bare
allegations of "injury" are insufficient to assert long-arm jurisdiction over Defendant
ORDER
^[20

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.

So Ordered by the Court this 4th day of April, 2002.

-6-

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020411292 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

|

day of

NAME
MARK L ANDERSON
ATTORNEY PLA
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE 1500
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84144
DENVER C SNUFFER
ATTORNEY PLA
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET
SANDY UT 84 047
20Qg) „

y

t Clerk

Page 1 (last)

DEFENDANT'S ADDENDUM NO. 6

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
2001 WL 417118 (S.D.N.Y.), 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791
(Cite as: 2001 WL 417118 (S.D.N.Y.))

Motions, Pleadings and Filings

United States District Court, S.D. New York.
STARMEDIA NETWORK, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
STAR MEDIA INC., Defendant.
No. 00 CIV 4647(DLC).
April 23, 2001.

OPINION AND ORDER
COTE, J.
*1 Plaintiff Starmedia Network, Inc. filed this action
on June 22, 2000, alleging that Star Media Inc.'s
domain name and corporate name infringe the
plaintiffs trademark rights. Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. On October 13, 2000, the Court allowed
plaintiff to conduct discovery on the issue of personal
jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, defendant's
motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New York. Plaintiff provides an
Internet "portal" in the Spanish and Portugese
languages. Through its website, which is named
"starmedia.com", plaintiff provides a variety of
information and services. Defendant, a Washington
company with its principal place of business in the
state of Washington, is a wholesale seller of software
that
recently
launched
a
website
called
"starmediausa.com." Plaintiff claims that defendant's
domain name infringes plaintiffs federally registered
"STARMEDIA" marks.
The defendant's website includes a chart of shipping
costs by time zone that comprises the entire
continental United States. The site is interactive:
although customers cannot purchase products through
the site, they can register with the site and use the site
to send comments to defendant. A company that
wishes to sell the defendant's software can download
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a dealer application from the website. In a password
protected area for registered users, product and
pricing information is available to existing customers.
Defendant estimates that only one out of 20 or 30
customers obtain a password.
While the defendant has sold goods in several states,
including New Jersey, it has not sold goods in New
York. The defendant has only two employees, and
approximately 200 customers.
At the time defendant filed the motion to dismiss, it
was disputing, inter alia, that it could reasonably
expect its actions to have consequences in New York
and that it derived substantial revenue from interstate
commerce. Defendant has since stipulated that it
receives substantial revenue from interstate
commerce. The defendant also admits that it solicits
business nationwide via the website and one of the
purposes of its website is to attract new customers,
including customers from New York. When the
defendant registered "starmediausa.com" in 1999, it
discovered that plaintiffs website existed, but did not
check to see what was available at starmedia.com.
DISCUSSION
In a diversity case or a case arising under a federal
law that does not provide for service of process on a
party outside the state, the issue of personal
jurisdiction must be determined according to the law
of the forum state. See Omni Capital Internationa! v.
Rudolf Wolf & Co,, 484 U.S. 97, 105-10 (1987);
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. Kinz, 126 F.3d 25, 27
(2d Cir.1997). "If the exercise of jurisdiction is
appropriate under [the state's statutes], the court then
must decide whether such exercise comports with the
requisites of due process." Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 27.
*2 It is well established that on a Rule 12(b)(2)
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
"the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the
court has jurisdiction over the defendant." Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez,
171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir.1999). The nature of the
plaintiffs obligation, however, "varies depending on
the procedural posture of the litigation." Ball v.
Metallurzie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194,
197 (2d Cir.1990). Where, as here, no evidentiary
hearing has been held but there has been discovery
regarding personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs burden
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is to make a prima facie showing which includes an
averment of the facts that, if given credit by the
ultimate trier of fact, would be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over the defendant. Kernan v. KurzHastinzs, Inc.. 175 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir.1999).
A. Long-Arm Statute
Plaintiff argues that the Court has personal
jurisdiction
over
defendant
under
Section
302(a)(3)(ii), N.Y. C.P.L.R. That section of New
York's long-arm statute provides that the Court may
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who
commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state ... if he
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to
have consequences in the state and derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinnev 1990). Thus,
in order to assert personal jurisdiction under New
York's long-arm statute, plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that (1) defendant committed a tortious
act outside of New York, (2) plaintiff suffered harm
in New York, (3) defendant should have reasonably
expected its actions to have consequences in New
York, and (4) defendant derives substantial revenue
from interstate commerce.
The principal issue in dispute regarding long-arm
jurisdiction is whether the defendant should
reasonably have expected its actions to have
consequences in New York; the plaintiff has clearly
met its burden on the other three factors. As noted,
the defendant has stipulated that it derives substantial
revenue from interstate commerce. Where an Internet
site displays allegedly infringing marks, the tort is
deemed to be committed where the website is created
and/or maintained, which is Washington. See Cable
News Network, L.P., L.L.L.P. v. Gosms.com, Inc., No.
00 Civ. 4812(LMM), 2000 WL 1678039, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) (collecting cases). Under
New York law, injury "within the state" includes
harm to a business in the New York market through
lost sales or customers, as well as harm and
threatened harm in the New York market resulting
from the confusion and deception of New York
computer users. See Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding
Co.. 97 F.Supp.2d 549, 568 (S.D.N. Y.200Q);
American Network v. Access America/Connect
Atlanta. Inc.. 975 F.Supp. 494, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Plaintiffs allegations of harm resulting from the
potential for confusion and deception satisfy the
requirement of an injury "within the state." See Cable
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News. 2000 WL 1678039, at *4; Telebyte. Inc. v.
Kendaco. Inc.. 105 F.Supp.2d 131, 135-36
(E.D.N.Y.200Q).
*3 Turning to the remaining factor, to establish a
reasonable expectation of consequences in New
York, the plaintiff must show an effort by the
defendant to serve the New York market. "New York
courts have asserted that the simple likelihood or
foreseeability 'that a defendant's product will find its
way into New York does not satisfy this element, and
that purposeful availment of the benefits of the laws
of New York such that the defendant may reasonably
anticipate being haled into New York court is
required." ' Kernan, 175 F.3d at 241 (citation
omitted). Thus, the defendant must make " 'a
discernable effort to directly or indirectly serve the
New York market." ' Id. (citation omitted). Applying
these principles to a claimed trademark infringement
through a website, a court has recently observed that,
[i]t is now well established that one does not
subject himself to the jurisdiction of the courts in
another state simply because he maintains a web
site which residents of that state visit. However,
one who uses a web site to make sales to customers
in a distant state can thereby become subject to the
jurisdiction of that state's courts.
National Football League v. Miller, No. 99 Civ.
11846(JSM), 2000 WL 335566, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2000) (citing Bensusan. 126F.3d25).
The plaintiff has met its prima facie burden of
showing that defendant made an effort to serve the
New York market, Kernan, 175 F.3d at 242, and thus
should have reasonably expected that its infringement
of plaintiffs trademark would have consequences in
New York. The defendant used its website to attract
and service business across the nation, including in
New York, and has received substantial revenue from
those interstate sales. Thus, this case can be
distinguished from Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc..
130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Or. 1997), where the court
refused to extend personal jurisdiction based on a
slightly interactive webpage where the business was
concentrated in one state except for personal contacts
generated by one of the defendant's founders. The
fact that the defendant has not yet made a sale in New
York does not defeat jurisdiction under Section
302(a)(3). Cf. Kernan. 175 F.3d at 242 (foreign
company attempted to serve New York market
through distributor's contractual right to resell
throughout the United States); American Network,
975 F.Supp. at 499 (offered services across the
United States and had New York subscribers). But
see American Info. Corp. v. American Infometrics,
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Inc.,- F.Supp.2d~, No. CIV. JFM-003288, 2001 WL
370109, at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 12, 2001).
B. Due Process
The federal due process jurisdictional inquiry has
two parts, the "minimum contacts" inquiry and the
"reasonableness" inquiry. Metropolitan Life Ins. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d
Cir.1996). The minimum contacts analysis is
governed by the Supreme Court case, International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its
progeny. Under the minimum contact analysis,
"[sjpecific jurisdiction exists when !a State exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum." ' Metropolitan Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 567-68
(citation omitted).
*4 In cases involving Internet activity, courts have
looked at the level and nature of the information
exchange occurring over the Internet to determine the
reasonableness of jurisdiction. See Hsin Ten Enter.
USA, Inc. v. Clark Enters., No. 00 Civ. 5878(SAS),
2000 WL 1886583, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,
2000); National Football League, 2000 WL 335566,
at *1. Using these criteria, Internet activity has been
classified using three categories: (1) "passive"
websites, which make information available to
visitors but do not permit an exchange of
information; (2) "interactive" websites, which permit
the exchange of information between the defendant
and website viewers, but do not involve the actual
conduct of business; and (3) websites in which the
defendant clearly does business over the Internet,
e.g., where a visitor may enter into a contract or
purchase goods or services through the website. See
Citigroup, 97 F.Supp.2d at 565; Hsin Ten, 2000 WL
1886583, at *4. It is generally agreed that jurisdiction
is not properly exercised in the first category, but is
properly exercised in the last category. When
considering the middle category, that is, sites which
are interactive but are not used to conduct business,
courts look to the " 'level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the Website" ' to determine whether
jurisdiction should be exercised. Mink v. AAAA Dev.
LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (citation
omitted); Cybersell, 130 F.3dat418.
In this case, defendant's website belongs in the
second category. As discussed above, the website is
interactive rather than passive. Furthermore, it is
entirely commercial in nature. The level of
interactivity, however, is limited. The defendant
Copr. © 2004 West. No (

contends that it does not take online orders or sell any
products directly over the Internet. It does, however,
provide customers with access to certain confidential
information through a password system, and does
support an exchange of information through
electronic mail.
Even with claims of trademark infringement arising
in the context of interactive commercial websites,
however, there is a serious question as to whether it
would be reasonable to allow, in essence, jurisdiction
over an alleged infringer "wherever the plaintiffs
principal place of business is located." American
Info., 2001 WL 370109, at *3. Thus, there are sound
reasons to require some further connection between
the defendant and the forum state. Here, the
defendant has additional contacts with New York that
make the exercise of personal jurisdiction
appropriate. First, the defendant knew of plaintiffs
domain name before it registered "starmediausa.com"
as its domain name. Therefore, the defendant knew or
should have known of plaintiffs place of business,
and should have anticipated being haled into New
York's courts to answer for the harm to a New York
plaintiff caused by using a similar mark. See
Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322 (9th Or. 1998); American Network, 975 F.Supp.
at 500. Coupled with this fact is the defendant's
substantial income from interstate commerce and
commercial use of the website to support its sales,
including potentially to New York customers. In
these circumstances, the plaintiff has shown prima
facie evidence of "minimum contacts" with New
York for purposes of specific jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause.
*5 The second part of the due process personal
jurisdiction test is determining the reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction. In undertaking this
reasonableness analysis, the Supreme Court has
identified the following factors:
(1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will
impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the
forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the
states in furthering substantive social policies.
Kernan, 175 F.3d at 244. The only burden argued
by defendant is the general inconvenience of
litigating in New York. It has offered no evidence,
however, to support an argument that this general
burden presents any particular hardship to it. None of
the other reasonableness considerations preclude the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.
SO ORDERED:
2001 WL 417118 (S.D.N.Y.), 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791
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